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NOTES
THE LIABILITY OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS FOR
UNFORESEEN ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Illness is the common companion of life; medicine aids the body in
responding to illness, but "[a]dverse reactions to drugs are as old as ,MIedi-
cine."' Harm inflicted when healing was anticipated has always been an
unwelcome surprise evoking a desire for redress. This feeling is reflected as
far back as 2200 B.C. in the Code of Hammurabi, which declared that a
physician who caused the death of a patient should suffer the loss of his
hand.2 Illness or death resulting from a drug taken for its curative value still
affronts the sensibilities. Injured parties increasingly look to the legal system
to fix the responsibility and determine who will bear the cost of an adverse
drug reaction.
An adverse drug reaction is a "noxious and unintended" response "which
occurs at doses used in man for prophylaxis, diagnosis or therapy."' The
majority of these reactions are either mild physical effects that do not require
treatment, or moderate reactions that necessitate discontinuation of the of-
fending agent and may demand some countermeasures. 4 These drug reactions
may be classified medically as an insult to the body, but it is doubtful that the
insult is of a sufficient magnitude to require a legal remedy. In contrast, the
severe adverse drug reaction that brings a person close to death and results in
1. Davies, Histo-' and Epidemiology, in Textbook of Adverse Drug Reactions 1. 1 ID
Davies ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Adverse Drug Reactionsi
2. Id.
3. Bennett & Lipman, Comparative Study of Prospective Surn,,eillan, c and l'oluntar) Report-
ing in Determining the Incidence of Adverse Drg Reactions, 34 Am J_ Hosp. Pharm '431. 931
(1977). This Note considers only adverse reactions to drugs taken at or near the recommended
dosage, and not problems presented by overdose, either intentional or accidental, and drug abuse
4. Id. at 932-33.
5. See Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Or. 89. 95. 409 P.2d 904. '407 tlyootl The Cochran court
feared that imposing liability for an unforseeable injury would result in absolute liability. thereby
rendering the pharmaceutical manufacturer liable for even mild gastric distress induced by
aspirin. Id. But see Note. Strict Liability in Tort: Its Applicability to Mantfacturers of
Prescription Drugs, 7 U. Cal. D. L. Rev. 487 (1974). This Note suggests that a pharmaceutical
manufacturer should be liable for "[a] substantial injury [thati might be defined as one requiring
medical attention or causing the loss of a day's work." Id. at 505 Such a proposal s
unsatisfactory, because broadly defining "substantial injury." would involve an enormou. poten-
tial for liability. In 1973, 1.5 billion prescriptions were filled by drugstores in the United States
Baiter, Coping With Illness: Choices, Alternatives, and Consequences, in Drug Development and
Marketing 27, 37 (R_ Helms ed. 1975). An intensive in-hospital study of adverse drug reactions
revealed that 3.6% of drug exposures were associated with a reaction serious enough to require
discontinuation of medication. Jick. The Boston Collaborative Drug Surt-rullan e Programme, in
Adverse Drug Reactions 61, 64 (D. Richards & R. Rondel eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Drug
Reactions]. Administration of a drug should not be stopped without medical consultation, and if
the broad definition of substantial injury was applied, pharmaceutical manufacturers would be
exposed to liability in 54 million cases per year by applying the aforementioned percentages.
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extensive medical treatment or permanent injury, and the lethal drug reac-
tion, may be conducive to tort litigation.
6
6. See notes 27-29 infra and accompanying text. Most adverse drug reactions involve tile
drug's toxicity. See Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1977) (discoloration of forming
bone by tetracycline resulting in permanent staining of child's teeth); Carlsen v. Javurck, 526
F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1975) (liver dysfunction following anesthesia administration); Salmon v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975) (chloramphenicol induced aplastic anemia); Hoffman
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973) (permanent eye damage from chronic ingestion
of chloroquine); O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1967) (potassium chloride
induced intestinal lesion); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct1 App.
1979) (abnormal blood clotting, thrombophlebitis associated with administration of oral con-
traceptives); Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d 476 (1979)
(anaphylactic shock following injection of X-ray contrast media); Johnston v. Upjohn Co., 442
S.W.2d 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (antibiotic induced anaphylactic reaction); Hill v. Squibb & Sons,
E.R., 592 P.2d 138.3 (Mont. 1979) (cortisone administration resulting in the formation of
cataracts and the development of osteoporosis); Torsiello v. Whitehall Lab., 165 N.J. Super. 311,
398 A.2d 132 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (aspirin related gastrointestinal hemorrhaging), Michael
v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1978) (kidney failure following chronic
ingestion of phenacetin); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81 (2d Dep't
1979) (intrauterine bleeding and fetal brain damage associated with maternal administration of an
anticoagulant); Crocker v. Winthrop Lab., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974) (debilitating addiction to
pain killing medication). There has been increasing concern over the possible carcinogenic,
teratogenic, and mutagenic effects of drugs. A carcinogenic effect is related to the ability of a
particular agent to cause cancer, as exemplified by diethylstilbestrol (DES), a drug routinely taken
from 1945 to 1955 for prevention of miscarriage. Siegler, Wang & Friberg, Fertility of the
Diethylstilbestrol-Exposed Offspring, 31 Fertility & Sterility 601, 601 (1979). It is estimated that
DES exposure in utero (as a fetus in the womb) of female :hildren has resulted in a risk of clear
cell adenocarcinoma of between 1.4/1,000 and 1.4/10,000. Id. at 602. DES also has teratogenic
activity, which, by definition, alters the normal development of the fetus. Stedman's Medical
Dictionary 1412 (4th unabr. lawyers' ed. 1976). Ninety percent of female offspring of DES treated
mothers have benign abnormalities of the genital tract. Siegler, Wang & Friberg, supra, at 602.
Alleged DES related injuries have been the subject of recent litigation, Mink v. University of
Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex.
1978); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978); Bichler v,
Willing, 58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dep't 1977). Special problems raised by DES
litigation are discussed in Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
Fordham L. Rev. 963 (1978). A drug with mutagenic effects causes mutations. In Jorgensen v.
Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973), the Tenth Circuit recognized a cause
of action for the husband of a woman whose ingestion of oral contraceptives allegedly resulted in
the birth of twins who were afflicted with Down's Syndrome, a genetic defect. Id. at 240-41. The
direct involvement of a drug in chromosome damage and the relationship between fetal
abnormalities to such damage is a burgeoning field of scientific research and controversy. Balson
& Roberts, Chromosome Disorders, in Adverse Drug Reactions, supra note 1, at 54-63.
The increasingly complex and artificial environment is replete with potentially toxic agents,
which, like pharmaceuticals, carry the risk of harm as well as the promise of benefit. See, e.g.,
Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., 594 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1979) (death from inhalation of aerosol
kitchen product); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir, 1975) (asbestos
exposure); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974) (same); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299
(1978) (same); Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa. 140, 226 A.2d 87 (1966) (air pollution from
beryllium). This Note is limited to an exploration of the problems encountered when harm is
produced by a drug "intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
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The scope of the problem of adverse drug reactions is not narrow, either in
its cost to the affected individual or to society. The reported frequency in
studies of these reactions ranges from less than one in one hundred to more
than one in four drug administrations.7 The Boston Surveillance Group
conducted an intensive in-hospital study to obviate the problems encountered
with previous studies that were poorly controlled and designed. 8 The survey
lasted four years and involved eleven hospitals and 6,750 patients. Almost
five percent of all drug exposures were associated with an adverse event. One
of every 200 drug exposures was associated with a "life threatening" adverse
reaction, and 0.4% of the monitored patients died of drug attributable
causes. 9 In addition to the physical effects on the human body, estimates of
the monetary cost of adverse drug reactions range from one billion dollars per
year, '0 three billion dollars per year and one-seventh of all hospital days," to
four and one half billion dollars per year.' 2
The drugs that cause these adverse reactions are developed, produced, and
marketed by pharmaceutical manufacturers. Drug-related injuries are increas-
ingly the basis of causes of action brought in strict liability in tort.' 3 These
of disease in man." Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(gltl)tB) (1976). A
medical definition of "drug" is "a chemical substance or product available for an intended
diagnostic, prophylactic or therapeutic purpose." Bennett & Lipman, supra note 3. at 931. The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act definition continues to embrace "articles (other than food)
intended to affect the structure or any. function of the body of man or other animals " 21 U.S.C. §
321(g)(1)(C) (1976). This more expansive definition includes materials such a-- the processed
animal bone employed in orthopedic operations, the subject of suit in E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.
v. Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S 961 t1974), and
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Jordan, 254 So. 2d 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 1971).
7. Davies, supra note 1, at 3. The enormous disparity in the reported frequency of adverse
drug reactions is a major concern of the medical profession. Poorly designed studies yield data
that has little significance in determining the true usefulness of a drug. Bennett & Lipman, supra
note 3, at 935.
8. Jick, supra note 5, at 61.
9. Id. at 64. The subjects of the study were in-hospital patients suffering from a
condition serious enough to require hospitalization prior to drug administration. The patients
were also subject to multiple drug administrations. During a "short stay" averaging 14 days, the
patients received a mean of 8.4 different drugs; a mean of 8.9 various medications were
administered during a "long stay" averaging 26 days. Id. at 63
10. M. Silverman & P. Lee, Pills, Profits and Politics 264 (1Q74). The cost of adverse drug
reactions is the subject of considerable debate. The authors derived this figure from a speech, the
same person was quoted in a separate source as placing the cost of adverse drug reactions at $1
billion per day per year. Gagnon, Public Health Issues in Medicine Use Control, in Perspectives
on Medicines in Society 36, 45 (A. Wertheimer & P. Bush eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Perspectives]. The latter figure would place the cost of adverse drug reactions at $365 billion per
year. The total health expenditures in the United States in 1976 were $139.3 billion, and drug
expenditures during the same period accounted for $11.2 billion. Campbell & Smith. Profitability
and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in The Pharmaceutical Industry 105, 112 (C. Lindsay ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Pharmaceutical Industry).
11. Melmon, Preventable Drug Reactions--Causes and Cures, 284 New Eng. J. Mcd. 1361,
1361 (1971).
12. M. Silverman & P. Lee, supra note 10, at 265,
13. Developments in this field have rapidly changed. As late as 1955, products liability
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cases "defin[e] the outer limits of strict liability [and present the] most
difficult questions of policy."'1 4 This Note explores these outer limits and
addresses these policy questions. It examines the problems encountered by
imposing strict liability for unforeseen adverse drug reactions' 5 on pharma-
ceutical manufacturers, and compares this approach to their liability under
the recently proposed Model Uniform Product Liability Act (Model Act).
2 6
I. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT AND DRUG RELATED INJURIES
Originally, negligence was the primary vehicle for recovering damages from
manufacturers for physical injuries caused by their products. ,7 The success of
the action turned on the plaintiff's ability to isolate the defendant's specific
negligent act and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.", Courts, frequently
faced with a severely injured plaintiff, strained to ease this burden,' 9 and they
did "not yet rank as a term of art in the courts of law." Wilson, Products Liability-Part I: Tile
Protection of the Injured Person, 43 Cal. L. Rev. 614, 614 (1955).
14. Kessler, Products Liability, 76 Yale L.J. 887, 930 (1967).
15. These reactions are medically classified as Type B Adverse Drug Reactions. They would
be the "totally aberrant effects that are unrelated to a drug's normal pharmacology .... They are
usually unpredictable and are not observed during conventional toxicological screening pro-
grammes. Although their incidence and morbidity are usually low, their mortality may be high."
Rawlins & Thompson, Pathenogenesis of Adverse Drug Reactions, in Adverse Drug Reactions,
supra note 1, at 10, 10. In contrast, Type A reactions are usually "the result of an exaggerated,
but otherwise normal, pharmacological action of a drug." Id. For example, a Type A reaction
would be the incidence of transient hypotension (low blood pressure) caused by an antihyperten-
sive drug. Agranulocytosis, a severe and often fatal blood disorder incurred following the
administration of chloramphenicol, the generic name of chloromycetin, would be an example of a
Type B reaction. Id. A number of reported cases have involved Type B reactions to chloromyce-
tin. Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975); Stevens v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2(1 378,
38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964); Parke, Davis& Co. v. Mayes, 124 Ga. App. 224, 183 S.E.2d 410(1971);
Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970); Whitley v. Cubberly, 24
N.C. App. 204, 210 S.E.2d 289 (1974); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
16. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
17. See, e.g., Halloran v. Parke, Davis & Co., 245 A.D. 727, 280 N.Y.S. 58 (2dDep't 1935);
Henderson v. National Drug Co., 343 Pa. 601, 23 A.2d 743 (1942).
18. See Webb v. Sandoz Chem. Works, Inc., 85 Ga. App. 405, 69 S.E.2d 689 (1952); Merrill,
Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 Va. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1973). In Webb, a woman
was partially blinded by the use of Cafergone, a patented medicine, and her husband sued the
drug manufacturer for the expenses of her illness. 85 Ga. App. at 405-06, 69 S.E.2d at 690. The
plaintiff was nonsuited for failing to supply specific evidence of the defendant's negligence, and
the court refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 410, 69 S.E.2d at 693.
19. See, e.g., Gottdanker v. Cutter Lab., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In Gottsdankcr, the
defendants manufactured Salk polio vaccine. Shortly after administration of the vaccine, two
children contracted crippling poliomyelitis. Although there was "substantial evidence to sustain a
finding that the vaccine contained live virus of poliomyelitis [the virus contained in the Salk
vaccine should not be viable,] and that the injected vaccine caused the disease in each child," the
jury concluded " 'that the defendant ... was not negligent either directly or by inference.' " 182
Cal. App. 2d at 605, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 322. The plaintiffs also alleged breaches of the implied
warranties of merchantibility and of fitness for the intended use. Id. The jury found for the
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recognized a cause of action for personal injury under a contract-like theory of
breach of implied warranty. 20 The American Law Institute finalized the
process by adopting a formulation for strict products liability. 2 t Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts delineates strict products liability for
physical harm to the user or consumer:
plaintiffs on the warranty counts, and the defendant's appeal asserted a lack of privity because
there had been no direct sale from the defendant manufacturer to the plaintiffs- Id at 606, 6 Cal-
Rptr. at 323. The district court of appeal noted that the privity requirement had been dispensed
with in many jurisdictions when the product in question was "food for human consumption." Id.,
6 Cal. Rptr. at 322. The implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness ran with the
food, allowing the consumer to recover from the food producer, despite the absence of privity. for
injury resulting from the ingestion of a contaminated food product. Id. at 607, 6 Cal Rptr at
323. The court considered the administration of the vaccine simply another form of "ingestion"
and therefore held that the warranties ran with the drugs. Id.
20. See Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602. 607. 6 Cal Rptr 320. 323
(1960); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384. 161 A.2d 69, 83-84 11960).
Warrant. has been termed "a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract."
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer, 50 Minn. L Rev 791. SOU
(1966). Recognition of a warranty cause of action raised contract problems of privity and sales
problems of notice in tort law. See Gottsdanker v, Cutter Labs., 182 Cal App. 2d at 606-47. 6
Cal. Rptr. at 322-23 (court was obliged to dispose of the privity problem before a cause of action
in warranty could be recognized because there had been no direct sale from defendant to
plaintiff); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 283-84, 512 P.2d 776, 781 (19731- But
cf. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 556, 309 N.E.2d 550, 555 (1974) (court ignored
the problem of notice in breach of warranty action under the U C C_ for a stroke following
administration of birth control pills because neither party raised the issue), A court may actually
dispense with the timely notice requirement under U.C.C, § 2-607 in a drug-related personal
injury suit. Fischer v. Mead Johnson Labs.. 41 A.D.2d 737, 341 N Y S.2d 257 t2d Dep't 1973)_
Privity problems in warranty actions have generally been resolved See Oresman v- G-D Searle
& Co., 321 F. Supp. 449, 453 (D.R.L 1971) (rejecting privity requirement for drug related
personal injury suit brought in warranty); U.C.C. § 2-318 (third parties may sue for breach of
express or implied warranties). Dean Prosser pointed out that warranty was from its inception
"only a rather transparent device to accomplish the desired result of strict liability " Prosser.
supra, at 802.
21. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) Dean Prosser pointed out that the
acceptance of strict liability through the Restatement was achieved without recourse to "war-
ranty." Prosser, supra note 20. at 802. Strict liability has superseded implied warranty in several
drug cases. See Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps.. 15 Cal App. 3d 75, SU. 92 Cal
Rptr. 825, 828 (1971); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal App 2d 424. 432. 79 Cal Rptr
369, 373 (1969). In Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co.. 388 F. Supp. 1070. 1072-73 D N J 1474).
re-,'d on other grounds, 534 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 429 U.S 1038 (1977). the court
refused to apply the contract statute of limitations for a personal injury action brought in
breach of warranty. Section 103 of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act [hereinafter cited as
Model Act] preempts the U.C.C. for products liability actions, except in cases of economic loss-
Model Act § 103, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62.720 (1979). Other courts, however, recognize both the
tort and warranty theories of products liability in dealing with drug related injuries Redes v
Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264. 1271 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 419 U-S. 1096 (1974). Raymond v Eli
Lilly & Co., 412 F. Supp. 1392. 1403 (D.N H. 1976). aff'd, 556 F 2d 628 (1st Cir 1977)1 These
courts apply a different statute of limitations when the action is brought in warranty, than if it is
brought in tort. Allen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.. 387 F. Supp 364. 367, (S D Tex 1974. Bern v
G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 5i3-54. 309 N.E.2d 550. 553-54, 119741; Redfield v .Mead,
Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 275-79, 512 P.2d 776. 777-79 (1973)
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(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
22
The Model Act 23 varies from section 402A by distinguishing the product
manufacturer from the product seller in determining duties and liabilities.
The manufacturer is "subject to liability to a claimant who proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the claimant's harm was proximately
caused because the product was defective." ' 24 Other "product seller[s]," such
as retailers and wholesalers, are liable only when the claimant proves that the
proximate cause of his injury was "such product seller's failure to use
reasonable care with respect to the product.1
25
Physical harm is a basic element in establishing a prima facie case of strict
products liability under section 402A. 26 The actual physical injury is usually
apparent in drug products liability cases, ranging from blindness, 27 to ir-
22. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have adopted this section, and the remaining states, with three exceptions, have
recognized some form of strict products liability in tort. [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) 4016.
23. 44 Fed. Reg 62,714 (1979).
24. Model Act § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (1979).
25. Id. § 105, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,726. The intermediary steps in the marketing chain from
manufacturer to consumer do not appear to be subject to strict liability under the Model Act.
This would accord with cases such as Bichler v. Willing, 58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st
Dep't 1977), in which the court declined to apply the theory of strict products liability to a drug
retailer who had sold DES to the plaintiff's mother.
26. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1) (1965).
27. MERI29, known as triparanol, a drug developed to lower blood cholesterol, produced
irreversible eye damage from chronic administration. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378
F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970);
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Cudmore v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003
(1967). Aralen, known generically as chloroquine, a drug originally marketed for acute adminis-
tration in the treatment of malaria, was found effective in controlling both lupus erythematosus, a
severe collagen disorder, and rheumatoid arthritis. Treatment of these two conditions required
chronic administration of the drug and resulted in irreversible eye damage. Hoffman v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Singer v. Sterlirg Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.
1970); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow,
408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966);
Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 15 Cal. App 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1971); Bine
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1968); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143
(Mo. 1967); Oppenheimer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 7 Ohio App. 2d 103, 219 N.E.2d 54 (1964);
Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Or. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966).
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reversible brain damage, 28 to death. 29 The Model Act does not limit the cause
of action to physical harm. It includes "mental anguish or emotional harm
caused by the claimant's being placed in direct personal physical danger." '30
The action, however, lies only with the injured person and not with third
parties.31
To recover under Section 402A, a plaintiff must prove that the proximate
cause of his injury was a defect in the product that rendered it "unreasonably
dangerous." 32 Under the Model Act, a defect is proved by showing that the
product was "unreasonably unsafe" in construction, in design, or because
adequate warnings or instructions were not provided. 33
28. A change in preservative in Quadrigen, a children's vaccine, resulted in a severe central
nervous system reaction and brain damage. Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F_2d 727 (2d Cir
1979); Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir 1969); Tinnerholm v Parke
Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). aff'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir- 1969), Vincent v
Thompson, 79 Misc. 2d 1029, 361 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1974). re,'d, 50 A D.2d 211, 377
N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1975).
29. Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1975) (anesthesia related death). Daly v
McNeil Labs., Inc., 509 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1975) (same); Gelley v. Astra Pharm. Prods.. Inc. 46b
F. Supp. 182 (D. Minn. 1979) (same); Brick v. Barnes-Hines Pharm. Co., 428 F Supp- 49b
(D.D.C. 1977) (death from liver damage from chronic administration of drug for treatment of
tuberculosis); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal Rptr 45 11973)
(fatal cases of aplastic anemia associated with administration of chloromycein); Magee v Wyeth
Labs., Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963) (death from a blood disorder.
agranulocytosis, a known side effect of a promazine tranquilizer), Lawson v G. D. Searle & Co-,
64 Ill. 2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 779 (1976) (death from multiple pulmonary emboli followIng
administration of oral contraceptives); Smith v. E.R Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich 79. 273
N.W.2d 476 (1979) (patient died from anaphylactic shock following injection of x-ray contrast
media); Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 210 S.E.2d 289 (1974) (aplastic anemia);
Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971) (same); Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514
S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974) (death related to addiction to a pain killer). Courts have refused,
however, to recognize a cause of action for mental distress for parents whose children were
adversely affected by drugs. Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713. 716 (N-D. Ill.
1978); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 355, 374 N.E.2d 683. 687-88 (1978),
aft'd, No. 50745 (Ill. Feb. 22, 1980); cf. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 415. 386 N.E.2d
807, 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 902 (1978) (disallowing parental recovery for negligent infliction of
mental distress for "wrongfully born" child); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y 2d 609. 617-19, 249
N.E.2d 419, 423-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 560-62 (1969) (bystander has no cause of action for
negligent infliction of mental distress). Contra, Shepard v. Superior Court. 7b Cal. App 3d 16,
19-20, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (1977); cf. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-43, 441 P.2d 912,
920-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80-82 (1968) (sanctioning third party cause of action for negligent
infliction of mental distress).
30. Model Act § 102(F), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,717 (1979).
31. See id.
32. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1) (1965). Controversy exists concerning the
independent meanings of "unreasonably dangerous" and "defective." The use of the term
unreasonably dangerous was specifically rejected in Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp . 8 Cal. 3d 121.
501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). This attempt to purge "unreasonably dangerous" from
strict liability terminology, however, has met with opposition. See generally Keeton. Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); 42 Fordham L. Rev 943 t1974)
33. Model Act § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (1979). A product will be considered
defective if "it did not conform to the product seller's express warranty " ld
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The construction or manufacturing defect generally occurs on the produc-
tion line. 34 In these cases, the product fails to meet the standards set by the
manufacturer and differs significantly from other units. Such cases are rare
with pharmaceuticals 35 because of intensive and effective quality control.
36
Injury from a manufacturing defect, however, renders the producer strictly
liable under both section 402A and the Model Act, despite the most elaborate
and detailed control system.
3
"
Although drugs may be properly manufactured, it is not presently possible
to design an effective but completely safe drug. 38 Almost all drugs have
the potential to inflict serious harm.3 9 A problem arises in determining when
this potential renders these drugs defective within the meaning of the law. 40
Comment k to section 402A specifically identifies certain drugs as "un-
avoidably unsafe products." It states that
[sluch a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. . . . The seller of such
products . . . is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk. 4'
34. E.g., Abbott Labs. v. Lapp, 78 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1935); Croft v. York, 244 So. 2d 161
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Sandel v. State, 115 S.C. 168, 104 S.E. 567 (1920).
35. Evidence existed of the presence of a live virus in the Salk polio vaccine manufactured by
the defendant in Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
Drugs contaminated with foreign bacteria have caused serious injury and have sometimes been
fatal. Abbott Labs. v. Lapp, 78 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 19353; Croft v. York, 244 So. 2d 161 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
36. Dunne, Assessment of Quality and Safety of Drugs, in Adverse Drug Reactions, supra
note 1, at 32, 32.
37. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965); Model Act § 104(A), 44 Fed, Reg. 62,714,
62,721 (1979); see Winthrop Labs. v. Crocker, 502 S.W.2d 850, 858-59 (Civ. App, 1973). rev'd on
other grounds, 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
38. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 9'), at 661 (4th ed. 1971). A degree of
toxicity is an essential element of an effective pharmaceutical. See note 148 infra and accompany-
ing text.
39. See generally Berman & Francke, Medicines and Drug Use Tomorrow-Some Biological
and Social Considerations, in Perspectives, supra note 10, at 533, 536-37.
40. Compliance with the provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is required prior to
the movement of a new drug in interstate commerce. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 355(a) (1976). Compliance is merely evidence that the drug was not defective as
designed. McDaniel v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 200-01, 241 N.W.2d 822, 828 (1976).
The evidentiary value of this compliance varies from very pertinent, Brick v. Barnes-Hines
Pharm. Co., 428 F. Supp. 496, 498 (D.D.C. 1977), to merdy an indication that the pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturer has met a minimum standard. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51. 65,
507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973); Michael v. Warner/Chilcot, 91 N.M. 651, 654,
579 P.2d 183, 186 (Ct. App. 1978). On the other hand, noncompliance gives rise to a presumption
of negligence. Toole v Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 703, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,
409 (1967). The jury may consider that the defendant manufacturer had violated the regulations,
Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 1973), even though such a violation
does not necessarily give rise to a private cause of action
41. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, Comment k (1965).
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Comment k does not limit drug liability under all conditions. It employs a
"risk benefit" analysis by comparing the reasonableness of the risk with the
benefit to be derived from the product.42 A product will be considered
unreasonably dangerous only if its utility does not outweigh the magnitude of
the danger. 43 A problem arises in determining when to balance the risk and
the benefit. Dean Keeton suggested that the benefit of the product should be
weighed by the "magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is
proved to be at the time of trial. '44 Courts have held, however, that the
balance is to be struck with the knowledge available at the time of injury. 5
This accords with the language in Comment k referring to a "known but
apparently reasonable risk."'4 6 Similarly, section 106 of the Model Act holds a
seller liable only if he knew of the drug's dangerous aspect and acted
unreasonably by marketing it.4 7 The protection afforded by Comment k and
the Model Act may be lost, however, if a drug that offered no substantial
benefit caused an injury, even if it was not foreseeable. 4s Such a drug could
be considered "unreasonably dangerous" as marketed. 49
The majority of drugs from which litigation has arisen over the past twenty
years are still marketed.5 0 The risk benefit ratio of these drugs still favors
marketing. The defect, if any, lies neither in the manufacturing process nor in
the formulation, but in the adequacy of the warning accompanying such
42. Id.
43. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 107. 1087 (5th Cir 1973). tcd
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Professor Wade has suggested factors to consider in thins balancing
process. "(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole. (2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it wll caue injury.
and the probable seriousness of the injury. t3) The availabilit> of a .substitute produtt uhich
would meet the same need and not be as unsafe. (4) The manufacturer's abilit% to eliminate the
unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expentive to
maintain its utility. (5) The user's ability to avoid danger bN the exercise of care in the use of the
product. (6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of
the existence of suitable warnings or instructions. (7) The feasibility, on the part of the
manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carring habilitt
insurance." Wade, supra note 32, at 837-38 (footnote omitted). Profesor Willig contend% that the
value and threat to the community must be considered, and not simply the individual benefits
versus the individual danger. Willig, The Comment k Charaeter A Con ceptual Barrier it Strut
Liability, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 545. 556 (1978)
44. Keeton, supra note 32, at 38 (emphasis in the original)
45. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.. 493 F.2d 1076. 1088-89 (5th Cir 1973) (the
decision to market entails a balancing of known danger and utilityl cert. denied, 419 V S, 869
(1974); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman. 388 N.E.2d 541. 545-46 (Ind. Ct. App- 19791 (same,
citing Borel).
46. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. Comment k (1965).
47. Model Act § 106(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62.714, 62.727 (1979)_
48. For a discussion of this possibility in relation to the Quadrigen cases see Comment. The
Diminishing Role of Negligence in Manufacturers' Liability for Unavoidably Unsafe Drugs and
Cosmetics, 9 St. Mary's L.J. 102, 112-14 (1977). Quadrigen was a children's vaccine altered for
convenience with disastrous consequences. See note 28 supra.
49. See note 88 infra and accompanying text.
50. See generally Physician's Desk Reference (33d ed. 1979),
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pharmaceuticals. 5 1 Comment h to section 402A provides that "[wihere . . .
[the seller] has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular
use. . . he may be required to give adequate warning of the danger ... and a
product sold without such warning is in a defective condition." 52 The Model
Act is in accord, and generally defines a defective product as one that was
"unreasonably unsafe because adequate warnings or instructions were not
provided." 53 If the product, for example, a drug, is one with "unavoidably
dangerous aspects," the Model Act holds the product seller liable if he failed
to warn of the known danger.5 4 Courts have uniformly expressed a willing-
ness to impose strict liability for drug related injuries when the duty to warn
existed and was breached.5 Furthermore, failure to warn when a warning is
required has been held sufficient to establish a defect.5 6 The plaintiff need not
establish that the product reached him without substantial change57 because
the defect is predicated on the warning, which is under the direct control of
the manufacturer.5 " Although the failure to warn must be established as the
proximate cause of the harm,59 there is a presumption that an adequate
warning will be heeded.
60
The threshold question involves delineating the parameters of the duty to
warn. The proper role of foreseeability in the duty to warn is an integral
aspect when discussing strict liability for unsforeseen adverse drug reactions.
Additionally, it must be determined when the duty arises, to whom it is owed,
and what constitutes an adequate warning.
51. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, Comment h (1965).
52. Id.
53. Model Act § 104(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (1979).
54. Id. § 106, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,727.
55. E.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991 (8th Cir. 1969) (a properly
manufactured drug is unreasonably dangerous if unaccompanied by a reasonable warning); Davis
v. Wyeth Labs., Inc.. 399 F.2d 121, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1968) (when duty to warn is not fulfilled,
seller may be held strictly liable in tort); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689,
7 10-11, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 413-14 (1967) (exemption from 3trict liability depends on all surround-
ing facts, including the warning given of known side effects); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman,
388 N.E.2d 541, 545-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (strict liability is avoided only when proper
warnings accompany a product).
56. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1275 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974);
Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 IIl. App. 3d 349, 351, 374 N.E.2d 683, 685 (1978), qff'd, No.
50745 (11. Feb. 22, 1980); Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 89, 273 N.W.2d
476, 479 (1979); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 287, 282 A.2d 206, 219 (1971). In New York,
"the failure to provide adequate warnings here establishes a prima facie case of product defect."
Ezagui v. Dow Chem Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 733 (2d Cir. 1979) (construing New York law). A
similar rule applies generally to drugs sold over-the-counter. Torsiello v, Whitehall Labs., 165
N.J. Super. 311, 320, 398 A.2d 132, 136-37 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
57. See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974).
58. Id.
59. Id.; Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979),
Vaughn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 272 Or. 367, 369, 536 P.2d 1247, 1248, (1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1054 (1976); Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 869-70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
60. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, Comment j (1965).
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II. DRUGS AND THE DUTY TO WARN
A. Foreseeability and the Duty to Warn
1. The Requirement of Foreseeability For Adverse Drug Reactions
Between seventy and eighty percent of adverse drug reactions result from
the known side effects of established drugs. 61 The pharmaceutical manufac-
turer has a duty to warn of these side effects. 62 A drug marketed without a
warning of known dangers is clearly defective, and the manufacturer will be
held strictly liable for any resultant injury. 6 3 Problems may arise, however,
when a consumer is injured by an unforeseen, totally aberrant side effect of
the drug. 64 These cases negate the manufacturer's ability to insulate itself
from strict liability through an adequate warning because the formulation of
an effective warning of unknown dangers presents insuperable semantic
difficulties. 65 Moreover, the alternative to liability for aberrant effects--
withholding the drug from the market and continuing testing until all possible
effects are revealed-is equally impractical because of the inherent limitations
of such testing. 66 Therefore, to promote the availability of beneficial new drugs,
the law provides protection from strict liability for the pharmaceutical man-
ufacturer when it cannot protect itself. 67 Because imposition of the duty to
warn is justified by the actual and constructive knowledge of the manufac-
turer, 68 strict liability is not imposed for the failure to warn of unknowable
adverse effects. 69 The drug is considered defective only if the manufacturer
does not warn of a known hazard. 70
61. It has been suggested that the majority of adverse drug reactions are not only known
effects, but predictable and perhaps preventable. M. Silverman & P. Lee, supra note 10, at 266.
The proportion of adverse reactions actually attributable to new drugs may be overestimated,
since physicians are more likely to report new drug toxicity at the urging of monitoring systems.
W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, Regulation and Drug Development 100-01 (1975).
62. See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text.
64. See note 15 supra.
65. See Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps.. 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 79-80, 92 Cal. Rptr.
825, 827 (1971).
66. A potentially serious side effect may have a very low incidence of occurrence. The drug
might have to be tested on thousands of patients before the hazard is revealed. Furthermore.
there may be a "long latency" period, and the side effect may not appear until many years after
administration. Dunne, supra note 36, at 38.
67. See Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 224 Pa. Super Ct. 418, 433. 307 A 2d 449. 458
(1973).
68. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 990 (8th Cir. 1969); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v.
Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 552-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979): McDaniel v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 196
Neb. 190, 202, 241 N.W.2d 822, 829 (1976). This requirement would also apply to drugs being
researched. Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 47, 588 P.2d 326,.340 (Ct. App. 1978).
69. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. Comment j (1965), provides that the product seller
must warn "if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge, of . . .the danger." A similar position is taken by the Model
Act: "[Piroduct seller shall not be subject to liability for harm caused by an unavoidably
dangerous aspect of a product unless [he] knew or had reason to know of the aspect and failed to
meet a duty to instruct or warn under Subsection 104(C) . Model Act § 106(B), 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714, 62,727 (1979).
70. See Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (Sth Cir. 1977). In contrast. foreseeability is
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Basing the imposition of a duty to warn on the manufacturer's knowledge
of the danger introduces the element of foreseeability into strict liability. 7'
Strict liability normally represents a shift in focus from the reasonableness of
the actions of the manufacturer based on its apprehension of a perceived risk,
to the essential character of the product. 7 2 This incorporation of the negli-
gence concept of foreseeability into the duty to warn has been criticized as a
step backward "denying strict liability an independent viability."'7 3
2. The Appropriate Foreseeability Standard
Several courts have acknowledged this incorporation of negligence elements
into strict drug products liability, 74 particularly when liability is based on
breach of the duty to warn. 7- Other courts have noted the similarities, but
differentiated negligent breach of the duty to warn from strict liability based
on the duty to warn.7 6 In Phillips v. Kiinwood Machine Co., 7 7 the Oregon
Supreme Court made a further departure from negligence by purging the
foreseeability concept from strict liability. The court's proposed test "to
determine the dangerousness of the article, as distinguished from the seller's
culpability, is to assume the seller knew of the product's propensity to injure
as it did, and then to ask whether, with such knowledge, he would have been
negligent in selling it without a warning."7 8 This standard has been approved
not required when the defect results from manufacturing error, see note 37 supra and accompany-
ing text, or when the manufacturer has made positive representations of safety. See notes 84-87
infra and accompanying text.
71. See generally McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion
Through the Maze of 'roducts Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 1
(1978); Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and Strict Products Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort
Law, 8 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 101 (1976).
72. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976);
McClellan, supra note 71, at 28.
73. McClellan, supra note 71, at 31.
74. E.g., Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 45, 588 P.2d 326, 338 (Ct. App. 1978); Carmichael
v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 988, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 400 (1971). The Texas Supreme Court held
that res judicata barred the plaintiff from proceeding in strict liability in a drug related injury
case when a judgment based on the same facts had been returned for the defendant manufacturer
in negligence. Abbott Labs. v. Gravis, 470 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1971).
75. Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 380 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d
269 (4th Cir. 1977). Separate jury instructions on negligence and strict liability have been denied
in this situation. See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 1969). Although the
jury need not reach additional findings of fact, an additional finding of law is required for strict
liability, that because "the manufacturer [was] negligent in endeavoring to warn of a risk, the
product is in a 'defective condition unreasonably dangerous.' " Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman,
388 N.E. 2d 541, 551-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
76. E.g., Dunkin v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 124-26 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 551 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
77. 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
78. Id. at 498, 525 P.2d at 1039. Phillips did not involve a drug related injury. The plaintiff
was hurt by a piece of wood that was accidently ejected from a tool. Id. at 488, 525 P.2d at 1034.
This imputation of knowledge to the manufacturer is still the minority view in products liability,
even outside the ethical drug industry. Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132
(1976) (plaintiff's arms severed by a forklift); Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 812, 579
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by only one reported drug related injury case. In Hamilton v. Hardy," the
plaintiff suffered a stroke after taking the defendant manufacturer's oral
contraceptives for eleven months.8 0 The Colorado Court of Appeals held that
the appropriate test to determine if the evidence is sufficient for the plaintiff to
recover in strict liability would " 'assume the seller knew of the product's
propensity to injure as it did.'"81
Recently, the Indiana Court of Appeals expressly rejected the Phillips test
in discussing drug related injuries. 82 Even the Phillips court has acknowl-
edged that the duty to warn is partially based on constructive knowledge.8
Foreseeability of harm is disregarded, however, in certain aspects of drug
products liability. In Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories,," the manufacturer's
representatives promoted Talwin, a pain killer, as being positively nonaddic-
tive. There was no evidence at the time of marketing that the drug was
addictive. Mr. Crocker took Tawin, became addicted, and subsequently died
from his debilitating addiction."5 The manufacturer was held liable because it
went beyond merely stating that there was no evidence of harmful effects by
actually promoting the drug as being without such effects.8 6 The positive
representation negated the absence of foreseeability. This type of "express
warranty" of a "material fact" also renders a manufacturer liable under the
Model Act.87 In this situation, the manufacturer is claiming knowledge it does
not have. It provides a false assurance of safety and induces unjustified
reliance by the drug user, thereby losing the defense of unforeseeability.
The Crocker court recognized that because some products are so dangerous,
the manufacturer should be liable without reference to his actual or construc-
tive knowledge.8 8 "[I]n the case of a generally beneficial or good product,"
when the manufacturer's liability is predicated on the adequacy of the
P.2d 940 (1978) (death from drowning subsequent to inhalation of a chemical), modified, 92 Wash.
2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979).
79. 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976).
80. Id. at 377, 549 P.2d at 1102.
S1. Id. at 385, 549 P.2d at 1108 (citing Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co, 264 Or. 4K5. 498.
525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974)). The trial court had refused to give the jury the plaintiff's tendered
instruction on strict liability for failure to warn, in addition to the negligence instructions- The
Colorado Court of Appeals held this refusal to be reversible error Id at 382-83. 549 P 2d at
1106.
82. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541. 547-48 lInd Ct App 19791
83. McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.. 270 Or 375, 389. 528 P 2d 522. 530 19741
84. 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
85. Id. at 42.9-30.
86. Id. at 433.
87. "In order to determine that the product was unreasonably un.,afe because it did not
conform to an express warranty, the trier of fact must find that the claimant. or one acting on the
claimant's behalf, relied on an express warranty made by the manufacturer or its agent about a
material fact or facts concerning the product and this express warranty proved to be untrue
"A 'material fact' is any specific characteristic or quality of the product. It does not include a
general opinion about, or praise of, the product.
"The product seller may be subject to liability under Subsection (D) although it did not engage
in negligent or fraudulent conduct in making the express warranty." Model Act § 104(D), 44
Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (1979).
88. Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1974).
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warning, however, even the Crocker court was not prepared to compare the
warning given with the facts known at the time of trial. 89 A problem in strict
liability is setting limits, 90 and like the Crocker court, other courts have
stopped short of imposing strict liability for failure to warn when the hazard
was unknown. 9 1 The duty to warn can arise only when there is knowledge of
the hazard. 92 This knowledge is not imputed to the manufacturer from the
facts available at the time of trial, but is determined by what was known at
the time of injury. 93 The Model Act also adopts this approach by requiring
actual or constructive knowledge when liability is based on a breach of the
duty to warn.
94
This adherence to a foreseeability standard may wed strict tort liability to
negligence when the action is based on the breach of a duty to warn. Dean
Prosser's 1960 statement that "there is not one case in a hundred in which
strict liability would result in recovery where negligence does not" 95 continues
to be valid in these cases. 96 Commentators have noted the concern that this
adherence to the negligence standard will work a hardship on the plaintiff
through the imposition of a heavy burden of proof.
97
When the severely injured victim of an adverse drug reaction is before the
court, however, there is a reluctance to let the injury go unremedied. 98 An
examination of the elements of the duty to warn illustrates the exercise of
judicial flexibility, even within the bounds of foreseeability, in providing
redress.
3. When Is There A Duty To Warn?
When the defect in a drug is the failure to warn, this failure "is by
definition the manufacturer's dereliction." 99 Therefore, the plaintiff need not
prove either that "the defect existed at the time the [drug] left the hands of the
89. Id. at 433.
90. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach, Co., 269 Or. 485, 491, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974).
91. E.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969); Ortho Pharm. Corp.
v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)
92. Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1977); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 353, 374
N.E.2d 683, 686-87 (1978), aff'd, No. 50745 (II1. Feb. 22, 1980); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v.
Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 69
Mich. App. 375, 382, 245 N.W.2d 52, 55-56 (1976), aff'd, 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d 476 (1979);
McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 270 Or. 375, 386, 528 P.2d 522, 528 (1974).
93. Daly v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 509 F.2d 617, 618 (6th Cir. 1975); Chambers v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd per cu'iam, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977);
Tomer v. American Home Prods. Corp., 170 Conn. 681, 687, 368 A.2d 35, 38 (1976); Donigi v.
American Cyanamid Co., 57 A.D.2d 760, 760, 394 N.Y.S.2d 422, 422-23 (1st Dep't 1977), aff'd
nere., 43 N.Y.2d 935, 374 N.E.2d 1245, 403 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1978).
94. Model Act §§ 104(C), 106(B)(3), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721, 62,727 (1979).
95. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J.
1099, 1114 (1960).
96. Merrill, supra note 18, at 31.
97. See McClellan, supra note 71, at 2; Merrill, supra note 18, at 50.
98. See pts. II(B)-(D) infra.
99. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.i, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974)
(emphasis deleted).
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defendant,"' 00 or that the defendant actually knew of the hazard that caused
the injury. It is enough that knowledge of the hazard existed.' 0 ' The
pharmaceutical manufacturer is accountable as an expert in the field and is
attributed both actual and constructive knowledge of its product.'0 2
Actual knowledge is first acquired through extensive premarket test-
ing.10 3 A manufacturer that does not test its product may be precluded from
raising the defense that no available test could have revealed the adverse
effect that caused the injury. 104 Once the drug is marketed, the manufacturer
is responsible for knowledge received from reports of adverse reactions."1" A
single letter reporting one adverse event may be offered as evidence of the
manufacturer's actual knowledge.' 0 6 The manufacturer may be charged with
the duty to warn even if the exact nature of the adverse reaction is un-
known. 1
07
The duty to warn continues after marketing is commenced. New informa-
tion concerning the drug's composition and effects must be incorporated into
the warning.108 Information contained in medical journals and other scientific
literature will be imputed to the manufacturer because of the duty to keep
abreast of these sources.109 If the adverse drug effect is reported in any of
these sources prior to a particular plaintiff's injury, the determination
whether the defendant "was or should have been sufficiently certain" of this
100. Id. (citing Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 868 tTex. Civ App I1731)_
101. A time continuum is emphasized in duty to warn cases. Courts attempt to determine at
what point sufficient knowledge was present, thereby creating the duty. Basko v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978. 98 (8th
Cir. 1969); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968)
102. Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1977). O'Hare v- Merck & Co , 381
F.2d 286, 291 (8th Cir. 1967); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 SV 2d 143, 152 (Io- 1967),
McDaniel v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 203-04, 241 N.W.2d 822, 829-30 (1976); Baker v
St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 405-06, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85-86 (2d Dep't 1979); Bichler v.
Willing, 58 A.D.2d 331, 335, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (1st Dep't 1977); McEwen v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 270 Or. 375, 386, 528 P.2d 522, 528 (1974).
103. See notes 156-63 infra and accompanying text. The duty to warn would be breached by
a failure to include information on adverse drug reactions observed only in animal test-s E.R
Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Heflin, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep (CCH) c 849Y. at
18,428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
104. Justice Jackson's dissent in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), noted that
"[tihe claim that a hazard was not foreseen is not available to one who did not use foresight
appropriate to his enterprise." Id. at 52 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see Hoffman v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing Justice Jackson). In contrast, one court rejected a
plaintiff's contention that animal tests available at the time would have demonstrated the
teratogenic effects of DES. McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 87 Cal. App. 3d. 77, 86, 150 Cal. Rptr.
730, 736 (1978); see note 6 supra.
105. Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 406, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (2d Dep't 1979).
106. Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143. 150 Mo. 1967)
107. Bine v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Mo. 1968).
108. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir 1970); Model Act §
104(C)(6), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (1979).
109. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1970), Krug v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 149 (Mo. 1967); McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 270 Or 375, 386,
528 P.2d 522, 531 (1974).
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effect to be under a duty to warn may be left to the jury. " "0 Once the duty to
warn arises, the manufacturer must effectively transmit the warning to the
consumer.
B. To Whom Must The Warning Be Given?
Initially, the pharmaceutical manufacturer was under no duty to warn
persons who were allergic to the product or who experienced an idiosyncratic
reaction."' A warning was required only when an appreciable number of
persons experienced a particular side effect. 112 These limitations have been
specifically rejected. Allergies and physical idiosyncracies are merely factors to
consider in determining the parameters of the duty to warn. 113 Although it
may be harder to anticipate allergic reactions. 4 these reactions are consid-
ered foreseeable and a duty to warn is imposed," 5 regardless of the nonexis-
tence of appreciable numbers.' 16 A duty to warn exists even if the people
affected represent a "small number of idiosyncratic or hypersensitive
users.' 7 In reality, the actual chance of occurrence may be very small. For
example, the manufacturer of Sabin polio vaccine was charged with the duty
to warn even though the risk of vaccine-induced polio was, at maximum, one
in three million administrations. ' 8
The duty to warn of dangers in prescription drugs is generally discharged
when an adequate warning is transmitted to the consumer's physician.' 19
110. Sterling Drug- Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1966). The Eighth Circuit has
suggested that when foreseeability is an issue, the defendant should be required to offer evidence
that no one could have foreseen the danger. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 12-13 (8th
Cir. 1964).
111. Oakes v. Geigy Agric. Chems., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 651, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713
(1969); Webb v. Sandoz Chem. Works Inc., 85 Ga. App. 405, 409, 69 S.E.2d 689, 692 (1952)
112. Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cerl
denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
113. Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 993.-94, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 404 (1971)
114. McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 270 Or. 375, 389, 528 P.2d 522, 530 (1974). Tile court
may consider this difficulty when hearing the case. Id.
115. Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (Qth Cir. 1968); Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
116. The Texas Supreme Court has noted that "[tihe failure to warn of a danger cannot
always be excused by the mere fact that the potentially endangered users are few in number
Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1974).
117. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 430 (2d Cir. 1969).
118. Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1343 (5th Cir. 1977).
119. McCue v. Norwich Pharm. Co., 453 F.2d 1033, 1035 (1st Cir. 1972); Dunkin v. Syntex
Labs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); Pierluisi v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 440
F. Supp. 691, 695 (D.P.R. 1977); Dyer v. Best Pharm. Corp., 118 Ariz. 465, 468, 577 P.2d 1084,
1087 (Ct. App. 1978); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 395, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 193 (1964);
Hawkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 481, 483, 249 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1978); Parke,
Davis & Co., v. Mayes, 124 Ga. App. 224, 224, 183 S.E.2d 410, 410 (1971); Gravis v.
Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). If the prescription drug is one
meant for animals, the duty to warn is discharged by a warning transmitted to the veterinarian.
Haste v. American Home Prods. Corp., 577 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (10th Gir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 955 (1979).
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Although the consumer need not be directly apprised of any danger, both the
prescribing and the treating physician must be warned.' 2 0 Because drug
effects are so complex, only a medical expert is expected to be able to
appreciate and balance the potential benefits of the drug with the hazards of
administration.1 2 ' Therefore, the physician stands as the " 'learned inter-
mediary' between manufacturer [or seller] and consumer."' 22 The Model Act
adopts this reasoning and provides that "Iflor products that may be legally
used only by or under the supervision of a class of experts, warnings or
instructions may be provided to the using or supervisory expert."' 2 3 The
transmission of the warning to the consumer is dependent on the medical
judgment of the physician. ' 24
Nevertheless, when a prescription drug is distributed in such a way that the
role of the "learned intermediary" is eliminated, as with the mass polio
immunization program, 2- no one stands between manufacturer and consum-
er. In such cases, the warning must run directly to the consumer.' 2 6 Even the
administration of a vaccine by a doctor in his private office may be sufficiently
clinic-like so that the duty to warn is not discharged by transmitting a
warning only to the physician. '2 7 In all cases, the duty to warn will be
discharged only by the effective transmission of an adequate warning.
C. hiat Is An Adequate Warning?
It is presumed that an adequate warning will be heeded,' 2 8 but the essence
of an adequate warning is not easily adduced. Federal law requires that drugs
be labeled with appropriate instructions for use,' 2 9 as well as information on
120. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132. 142 (3d Cir 1973). MNCEuen v Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 270 Or. 375. 387. 528 P.2d 522, 529 (1074). Oral contraceptive. are an exception
to this general rule. The manufacturer is required to transmit information on the effectivenes
and possible effects of the contraceptive directly to the consumer through a patient package
insert. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (1978).
121. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264. 1276 (5th Cir.). cert denied. 419 U S lv6
(1974).
122. Id. Similarly, the duty to warn for intrauterine contraceptive device, i, ,atifitd b%
notifying the physician. Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co.. 90 Wash 2d j. 14. 577 11 2d 975. Y7
(1978).
123. Model Act § 104(C)(5). 44 Fed. Reg. 62.714, 02.721 (197)
124. Dunkin v. Syntex Labs., Inc.. 443 F. Supp. 121. 123 fW D Tenn 1977). Calabre.e v
Trenton State College, 162 N.J. Super. 145. 156-57. 392 A.2d 600, 606 (Super Ct App Div
1978); Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co.. 502 S.W.2d 863. 870 (Tex Civ App 1'73i
125. See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc.. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir 19()8)
126. Reyes v. Vyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264. 1274-76 (5th Cir.. ert dented, 414 U S ltU'b
(1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir 19681; Cunningham v Charles
Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla. 1974),
127. Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir 1977). In Givens. a mother developed
polio following administration of Salk polio vaccine to her child, Id at 1343 The impact of this
and other Sabin polio vaccine cases on the duty to warn is discussed in Note. Ditty to Warn
Extended to Bystander in Close Contact with Polio l'accine, 29 Mercer L_ Rev 6.43 t1978)
128. Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958. 991. 95 Cal Rptr 381. 402 (19711.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. Comment j (1965).
129. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U S.C. § 352f) (1476
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contraindications, side effects, and effectiveness. 130 Although compliance
with these regulations does not make the warning adequate as a matter of law
for purposes of civil liability, 13  it may establish a minimum standard. 232
Conversely, noncompliance may constitute negligence per se. 13 3 Under the
Model Act, compliance is evidence that the product is not defective, while
noncompliance is accorded similar evidentiary weight in showing a defect. 131
"[A] proper warning must adequately state the risk."'1 35 In determining
when the risk is adequately stated, a balance must be achieved. A warning
may be adequate when experts say that a stronger warning would be
incorrect. 136 The warning must be strong enough, however, for if it remains
unchanged when the manufacturer knows it is being widely disregarded, it
will be considered inadequate. 137 Finally, even the clearest, most complete,
and most comprehensive warning will be inadequate if it can be shown that
the manufacturer dissipated or eroded the effectiveness of the warning
through overpromotion of the drug.' 3
8
Specific guidelines for an adequate warning do not exist. The warning must
be "reasonable under the circumstances."' 39 Circumstances vary, however,
and jurisdictions define "reasonable" differently. 140 Although these differences
may lead to inconsistent results, the consistency provided by absolute strict
liability that removes foreseeability from the duty to warn would lead to even
greater injustice.
III. THE EFFECT OF IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY FOR UNFORESEEABLE
ADVERSE DRUG EFFECTS
Foreseeability of harm could be eliminated as a necessary element in
establishing liability for a breach of the duty to warn. The pharmaceutical
manufacturer would simply be liable for any adverse drug reaction unless an
130. Id. § 352(n). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements for tile content
and format of the drug label are set out in 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (1979).
131. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Civ. App. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
132. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45,
53 (1973); Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 654, 579 P.2d 183, 186 (Ct. App 1978)
133. Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 733 (2d Cir. 1979).
134. Model Act § 108, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,730 (1979).
135. Willig, supra note 43, at 568.
136. Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202, 206 (8th C;r. 1975).
137. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 292, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (1971).
138. Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1975); Stevens v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973); Whitley v.
Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 207-08, 210 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1974); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa.
263, 291, 282 A.2d 206, 221 (1971). A drug is overpromoted when an aggressive sales program
may cause a doctor to disregard a warning. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d at 65, 507
P.2d at 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 53; Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. at 207-08, 210 S.E.2d at
292. The theory that overpromotion dissipates the adequacy of a given warning parallels the
rationale underlying the imposition of liability in the presence of positive representations of
safety. See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text. In both situations, the pharmaceutical
manufacturer's own actions negate the protection from strict liability.
139. Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 655, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (Ct. App. 1978).
140. Merrill, supra note 18, at 49-50.
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adequate warning was previously transmitted. The complexity of drug prod-
ucts litigation might be reduced, and it would no longer be necessary to prove
what information was known, when it was known, and if it was sufficiently
known. This simplistic approach, however, is not one chosen by the courts' 4'
or proposed in the Model Uniform Product Liability Act. ' 42 Foreseeability is
retained because its removal would clash with the two policies that justify the
imposition of strict liability-providing incentives to more careful conduct,
and risk allocation to the one in the best position to insure against failures. '
43
The incentive theory is premised on the belief that strict products liability
results in safer products. 14 4 Of all products, however, this justification seems
especially inappropriate as applied to ethical drugs.' 45 Drugs are properly
characterized as "unavoidably unsafe products,' 146  or products with
"[u]navoidably dangerous aspects."'4 7 They are by nature toxic, although
administration of the drug seeks to maximize the toxic effect in those parts of
the body afflicted with the disease and to minimize it in other parts of the
body. 148 For these reasons, it is irrational to suppose that a legal obligation
imposed on a pharmaceutical manufacturer can alter the essential nature of a
drug. Moreover, it is unlikely that the threat of strict liability would spur the
manufacturer toward more intensive and extensive premarketing tests to
reveal latent dangers.'
49
The pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated by statute'5 0 and by the
141. See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S- 1096 (1974).
Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969). Chambers v G-D. Searle & Co, 441
F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977). Christofferson v Kaiser
Foundation Hosps. 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1971), Ortho Pharm Corp. v
Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharm Corp , 224 Pa.
Super. Ct. 418, 307 A.2d 449 (1973); pt. II supra.
142. Model Act. § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714. 62,721-22 (1979). The role of fores.eeabilitv in
strict liability is discussed in Willig, supra note 43, and criticized in McClellan. supra note 7 1. and
Polelle, supra note 71.
143. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F Supp 353 (E.D.N.Y 1972). See
also Polelle, supra note 71, at 104.
144. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co.. 269 Or. 485, 503, 525 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (1974) (en
banc).
145. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 Rutgers L.
Rev. 947, 1015 (1964).
146. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. Comment k (1965).
147. Model Act § 106, 44 Fed. Reg. 62.714. 62,727 (1979).
148. Altschule, Bad Law, Bad Medicine, 3 Am. J. L. & Med. 295. 298 t1977).
149. Even the supporters of strict liability recognize the problems involved with the incentive
approach. McClellan, supra note 71, at 25-28 (the deterrence view must be abandoned as a
primary goal of strict liability if one wishes to dispense with reasonableness and foreseeability);
Polelle, supra note 71, at 113 (the incentive approach leads back to problems of foreseeabilityl;
Rheingold, supra note 145, at 1015 (strict liability seems unlikely to produce a greater degree of
care by a drug manufacturer).
150. E.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976); Act of Mar-
4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 832 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1976)). Federal regulation of the
pharmaceutical industry has often been undertaken in response to drug related disasters. The
death of 10 children from a diphtheria vaccine tainted with tetanus prompted the passage of the
Virus, Serum, and Toxin Act of 1902. Act of July 1. 1902. Pub. L, No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728-29
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1976)); see Taylor, Introduction. in Drug Induced Clinical
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Food and Drug Administration (FDA).' 5 ' 'The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act' 512 prohibits the marketing of a new drug until the FDA
approves a New Drug Application submitted by the manufacturer that
demonstrates the drug's "safety" for its intended use.153 The thalidomide
disaster, which caused the birth of severely deformed children, facilitated the
adoption of the 1962 Harris-Kefauver Amendments. 5 4 They require "safety
and efficacy" for new drug approval, and provide for the withdrawal of
approval of older drugs if new evidence reveals a serious challenge to their
"safety or efficacy.' 5 5 The FDA requires exhaustive premarket testing before
it will approve a new drug.156 If the premarket testing plan is approved,
57
the clinical investigation proceeds in three phases. Phase I examines the
pharmacologic effects of the drug on human beings-what the drug does to
humans and in what doses.' 5 8 In Phase II, the drug is administered to persons
as therapy for a specific medical condition. The physiologic changes produced
by the drug are intensively monitored. Such changes may be beneficial, in the
form of treatment, or harmful, in the form of side effects. 159 Phase III clinical
studies involve larger numbers of patients. The studies continue to be
carefully monitored and are used to define the most appropriate drug dosage
and treatment techniques.' 60 The FDA must be informed of results and
Toxicity xv, xvi (McMahon ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Clinical Toxicity]. The Pure Food and
Drug Act was passed in 1906. Food & Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat.
768 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1976)). By 1927, the FDA was an independent regulatory
agency. L. Cluff, G. Caranasos, & R. Stewart, Clinical Problems With Drugs 7 (1975). The early
legislation primarily focused on baseless claims of curative power. The "elixir sulfanilamide
disaster" of 1937, in which more than one hundred people died when a sulfa drug was dissolved
in diethylene glycol and distributed without testing, facilitated the passage of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act in 1938. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717,
52 Stat. 1040 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976)); see W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, supra note
61, at 7-8.
151. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1-1300 (1978 & 1979).
152. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976).
153. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1976); Gagnon, supra note 10, at 38.
154. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-731, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
155. L. Cluff, G. Caranasos & R. Stewart, supra note 150, at 8. Currently, drug reform
legislation submitted to Congress in May of 1979 is still pending. See Drag Law Reform: The
Record is Still Open, 19 Am. Pharm. 10 (1979).
156. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1976). The testing required to gain FDA approval may last from
five to eleven years and may cost from five to fifteen million dollars. Editorial, 18 Am. Fam.
Physician 67, 67 (1978). FDA approval of the premarket testing plan is also necessary prior to
interstate shipment of the drug for clinical investigation. M. Dixon, Drug Product Liability § 5.03,
at 5-12 (1979). Furthermore, before human clinical studies are initiated, the sponsor of a new
drug must submit a Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug (IND) to the
FDA. 21 C.F.R. § 314.1(d) (1978). The IND reports the results of animal toxicity studies and
includes a detailed outline (a protocol) of the proposed investigation. M. Dixon, supra, § 5.03, at
5-13 n.1.
157. 21 C.F.R. § 314.105 (1978).
158. M. Dixon, supra note 156, § 5.03, at 5-13.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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progress throughout the entire testing process. 16 Many drugs may pass the
first three phases but receive only limited FDA approval that requires
postmarketing surveillance and initially, controlled distribution.' 62 This has
been termed Phase IV, and eventually may represent an additional step for all
drugs prior to full approval.'
63
Strict liability is justified on the purely economic ground that the manufac-
turer is in the best position to absorb and distribute the cost of minimizing the
risks associated with the product. 164 Nevertheless, the incentive theory, with
its resultant extensive testing, is an inadequate justification for imposing strict
liability on pharmaceutical manufacturers because of the costs involved.
Under present regulations, the cost of developing a new pharmaceutical is
estimated at twelve million dollars. 16- The pharmaceutical industry is the
major source for the development of new drugs, and, because it is a profit
motivated industry, 166 the cost of more extensive testing for safer drugs would
be reflected in higher drug prices. This result, however, may be equitable,
because drug consumers directly benefit from increased safety and would
directly bear the cost of minimizing the risk. Nevertheless, despite this one
equitable argument, other costs of more extensive testing cannot be so fairly
distributed and mitigate against imposing strict liability.
Data supplied by laboratory tests on animal models are, by nature, of
limited application to human beings because of species difference. 167 Ulti-
mately, the effects of a drug on a human can only be determined by testing it
on human subjects. The costs of this type of more extensive safety testing
would be less equally apportioned among consumers. Phase I clinical trials,
the first administration of the drug to a human being, require healthy
volunteers, who are usually male and often inmates in penal institutions. 168
When a test drug is administered to any healthy subject, the attendant risk is
161. The present requirements for approval of a new drug are set out by the FDA in the U S
Dep't. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service. Food & Drug Admini-stration.
Publication No. 74-3015, Clinical Testing For Safe and Effective Drugs (undated)- A thorough
and detailed description of the process is available in IM. Dixon. supra note 156. §§ 5.03--04
162. W. Wardell & L. Lasagna. supra note 61, at 147-48
163. See Johnstone, Phase IV Testing-Overniew and Sunmary of Pending Legislative Pro-
posals, 33 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 173, 175-76 (1978). The imposition of Phase I' appears
imminent. Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1980, at 14, col. 2.
164. W. Prosser, supra note 38, § 75. at 494 n.27, 494-95, Similarly. one aim of the Model
Act is to place an incentive for preventing loss on the party best able to achieve that goal Model
Act, Criteria for the Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62.714, 62,715 tl974.
165. Schnee & Caglarcan, The Changing Pharnaeeutical Research and Development Erti-
ronment, in Pharmaceutical Industry., supra note 10. at 91. 103
166. "[Of the 70 most valuable compounds introduced to medicine [in] this century Since the
discovery of aspirin in 1899, only ten have come from Universities and Research Insututes. All
the rest have been discovered and developed by scientists in the laboratories of an industry
operating under the profit system." Dunlop, The Assessment of the Safety of Drugs and the Role of
Governient in Their Control, 7 J. Clin. Pharm. 184, 185-86 (19671; see Rheingold. supra note
145, at 954.
167. See generally Dunne. supra note 36, at 34, Taylor. Animial-Hunian Correlations, in
Clinical Toxicity, supra note 150, at 1.
168. Frey, Wild & Teller, Norial Ranges qf Laboratory Parameters in Captive and Non-
captive Populations, in Clinical Toxicity, supra note 150. at 45. 46.
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very real, and the presence of a counterbalancing benefit to this individual
is questionable. 169 The participants in Phase II and III clinical trials are
seldom private patients. They have some chance to benefit from the drug
because it was developed specifically to relieve their ailment. The preferred
clinical trial, however, is a double-blind procedure in which the effects of a
new drug are tested against either a placebo or an established therapeutic
agent.' 70 Neither the administering physician nor the volunteer patient know
the identity of the drug administered.' 7 ' The subject of such a trial assumes
the risk of receiving no curative therapy if a placebo or a less effective
treatment is assigned. Testing must actually be continued until one drug is
proved significantly more effective to establish valid trial results. t72 If drug
safety could be achieved through more extensive testing, the price could not
be judged by monetary cost alone. There is a human cost that falls primarily
on the incarcerated, the indigent, and the ill.
Furthermore, society pays for the imposition of strict liability by being
denied the benefit of new therapeutic agents.
[T]here are two risks involved in the development of new drugs: (1) the risk that
unforeseen, perhaps catastrophic, injuries will result because a new drug is used in
man too soon; and (2) the risk that needless human suffering and death will occur
because a beneficial drug is withheld from mankind too long. Absolute liability for the
adverse effects of new drugs would enlarge the latter risk to unacceptable proportions,
while giving a remedy only to those injured by the former risk. 73
Prolonged premarket testing by pharmaceutical manufacturers to limit liabil-
ity would result in an increase in "drug lag"--the phenomenon of "new drugs
being approved for use consistently later in the United States than in other
medically advanced countries.' 74 Drug lag results in drugs being withheld
from the public, as the manufacturer attempts, through testing, to uncover
potentially serious side effects.' 7 - A drug manufacturer will never be sued by
169. Prisoners are often the "most willing and the most vulnerable of all subjects of medical
experimentation." Although they receive a small remuneration, they frequently participate under
the misguided belief that such participation will be viewed favorably by the parole board. In most
states, it will not. Address by Dean Robert McKay, American Bar Association Annual Meeting,
Section of Science and Technology Educational Program (Aug. 5, 1977), reprinted in 19
Jurimetrics 336, 336-37 (1979).
170. Who Shall Live? The Tribulations of Clinical Trials, 19 Am. Pharm. 234, 234 (1979).
171. Id.
172. In these situations, the question arises "whether a physician could ethically allow a
patient to agonize or die for the sake of the trial." Id. at 235.
173. Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 48-49, 588 P.2d 326, 341-42 (Ct. App. 1978). An almost
identical theory has been proposed in an eminent medical journal. "The problem of drug-induced
illness can be defined by the magnitudes of two risks-the added risk of illness experienced by
users of a drug, and the baseline risk in the absence of the drug." Jick, The Discovery of
Drug-Induced Illness, 269 New Eng. J. Med. 481, 481 (1977).
174. Wardell, A Close Inspection of the 'Calm Look', 239 J.A.M.A. 2004, 2005 (1978). Tile
significance of the "drug lag" resulting from present regulations and liability is a subject of
continuing controversy. Dr. Wardell's article is a response to an earlier article by former FDA
Commissioner Dr. Donald Kennedy. See Kennedy, A Calm Look at 'Drug Lag', 239 J.A.M.A. 423
(1978).
175. See generally W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, supra note 61, at 93-107.
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the multitudes who suffer because a drug was not released. ' 76 Moreover, the
deterrent effect of strict liability can be awesome. For example, if a drug with
the potential therapeutic impact of penicillin is not released because of overly
stringent testing procedures, more people will be harmed by the deprivation
of that single agent than "by all the toxicity that has occurred in the history of
modern drug development. '1 77
More extensive premarket testing can therefore increase the cost of a drug
and delay or even prevent its release, yet still fail to reveal some aberrent
effect. 178 The market is the ultimate laboratory, and the consumer is the
ultimate test subject. 179 The desire for "effective drugs developed without
attendant risk or toxicity" has been termed a desire for "something for
nothing,"' 8 0 a wish for " 'progress without price.' ,,1s No theory of strict
liability can fulfill that desire or grant that wish.
Although the imposition of strict liability for failure to warn of unforeseen
hazards cannot prevent injury by producing significantly safer pharmaceuti-
cals, it can provide that the manufacturer will bear the cost of any injury that
ensues.'8 2 If drugs cannot be made completely safe, any loss suffered by the
producer in compensating for consumer injury is a cost of engaging in such a
business.' 8 3 The risk allocation theory envisions that this loss can be "treated
as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained.""'q
If the hazard is unforeseeable, however, the resulting damages are equally
unforeseeable and impossible to reflect accurately in the "product price
schedule."18 5 The ability of the manufacturer to anticipate and absorb the
cost of product related injuries is significantly impaired by an unknowable
danger. 18 6 Furthermore, it is impossible to insure accurately against un-
foreseeable adverse drug reactions.' 8 7 The sufficiency and cost of any insur-
ance may be severely disproportionate to the actual risk or loss.' 88 High
176. "Clearly, a decision has been made that some individuals will suffer from diease in
order that others may be protected from drug-induced diseases. Such a decision appears to be
based upon the value that a society should avoid the appearance of taking a life or otherwise
directly causing suffering (in this case through drug-induced disease), though this may mean that
some individuals, who contact [sic] a disease for which society has no direct responsibility, will
suffer." Anthony, The Patient As A Consumer, in Perspectives, supra note 10. at 358. 363
(footnote omitted).
177. W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, supra note 61, at 138.
178. See Inman, Detection and Investigation of Adverse Drug Reactions, in Adverse Drug
Reactions, supra note 1, at 41, 41; note 61 supra and accompanying text.
179. See W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, supra note 61, at 146.
180. Azarnoff, Academic Drug Evaluation, in Controversies in Clinical Pharmacology and
Drug Development 19, 20 (R. Palmer ed. 1972).
181. McMahon, Introduction, in Future Trends in Therapeutics ix (F. McMahon ed. 1978]
182. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57. 63. 377 P.2d 897. 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
183. Rheingold, supra note 145, at 1017.
184. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, Comment c (1965)
185. See Willig, supra note 43, at 547.
186. See Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 333 F. Supp. 98, 101 (S.D. W. Va. 1971)
187. Rheingold, supra note 145, at 1015-16.
188. Model Act § 101(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,716 (1979).
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premiums may force manufacturers to go uninsured, 18 9 and manufacturers of
high risk products, such as drugs, may become reluctant to develop new
products. ' 90
It is not suggested that pharmaceutical manufacturers will completely
terminate research and development of new drugs if held strictly liable for all
adverse reactions. The pharmaceutical industry is highly competitive;' 9 1 new
drugs must be produced to insure a company's continued existence,19 and the
potential benefits of a successful new drug are enormous. 193 Nevertheless, the
introduction of new drugs would be delayed, and certain agents might never
be marketed, because the marketing of a new drug involves multiple risk-
benefit analyses. The risk of adverse drug reactions must be balanced against
the drug's therapeutic effect. Furthermore, the risk of liability from adverse
drug reactions must be weighed against the potential market for the drug. A
drug with enormous therapeutic potential may have a limited market and be
associated with a high degree of liability. ' 94 This type of drug would be most
adversely affected by the imposition of strict liability because the pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers would probably shelve such a drug to limit the potential
losses.' 95 For example, premature delivery is the major cause of infant death
during the period immediately following birth, as well as a major cause of
mental retardation. 196 The search for a drug to control premature labor is a
primary clinical objective, 197 but the possible liability associated with market-
ing such a drug is substantial. The drug would be given during pregnancy, a
high risk period for adverse effects. It would affect a high risk group, infants,
particularly premature infants.98 Furthermore, the statute of limitations
would be extended by the infancy of the potential plaintiff. 199 Finally, the
189. Ross, Current Trends And Reforms: Legislation--Jndicial-Industry, in Prevention and
Defense of Manufacturers' Products Liability, Course Handbook Series No. 121, 855, at 858
(1978).
190. Id. Moreover, the cost of such insurance would probably be reflected in an increase in
product price schedules. See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 341, 298 N.E,2d 622, 627-28. 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 468-69 (1973). Such price increases might place the cost of essential drugs beyond
the reach of some consumers. Rosenn, Litigation Involving Manufacturers Liability for Dcfectivc
Medical Products: Judicial Perspectives, 2 Am. J. L. & Med. 245, 251 (1976).
191. Schnee & Caglarcan, Economic Structure and Performance of the Ethical Pharmaceuh.
cal Industry, in Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 10, at 23, 27. The proportionate share of the
market shifts rapidly among the top firms. Id.
192. Rheingold, supra note 145, at 1017.
193. For example, SmithKline Corporation experienced a 95% increase in net earnings in one
year due to the successful introduction of Tagamet, an ulcer remedy. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1979,
§ C, at 1, col. 4.
194. See Lauersen, Merkatz, Tejani, Wilson, Roberson, Mann & Fuchs, Inhibition of
Premature Labor: A Multicenter Comparison of Ritodrine and Ethanol, 127 Am. J. Obstet. &
Gynecol. 837 (1977).
195. See Rosenn. supra note 190, at 251 (imposition of liability could force the drug
manufacturer to remove a medically useful product from the market).
196. Lauersen, Merkatz, Tejani, Wilson, Roberson, Mann & Fuchs, supra note 194, at 838
197. Id. at 837-38.
198. Davies, supra note 1, at 6.
199. See, e.g., Piasturo v. McCloud, 26 A.D.2d 610, 271 N.Y.S.2d 94 (4th Dep't 1966),
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drug would have a limited market because it would be administered in acute,
rather than chronic situations.20 0
In these cases, the manufacturer only apparently bears the loss; the true
cost is borne by society. Strict liability cannot effectively help prevent the
injury; neither the incentive nor the risk allocation theories justify its imposi-
tion on pharmaceutical manufacturers. Other methods of injury prevention
and compensation for unforeseeable adverse drug reactions should be consid-
ered.
IV. SUGGESTIONS IN LIEU OF STRICT LIABILITY
Presently, the law has determined that the cost to society of strict liability
for failure to warn of unforeseeable adverse drug effects is too high and,
therefore, it exempts the manufacturer from liability in this limited situa-
tion.201 The injured consumer left without remedy. however, may not ap-
preciate the justification for this decision. Courts have endeavored, within the
limits of foreseeability, to provide a remedy, and these efforts are frequently
successful.20 2 Further protection for the consumer, however, should be pro-
vided by the legislature.
The most effective drug attacks the etiology of a disease rather than the
symptoms. The etiology is often obscure or unknown, and, therefore, therapy
can only be palliative. Often, ignorance is the cause of problems stemming
from unforeseeable adverse drug reactions, and knowledge can alleviate these
problems. In the risk benefit calculus, it is essential to determine whether the
marketing of the product, even with warnings, \w'as justified either legally 2 3
Francies v. County of Westchester. 3 A.D,2d 850. 161 N.Y.S.2d 501 t2d Dep't lJ57i. N Y Civ
Prac. Law § 208 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1979).
200. See Lauersen, Merkatz. Tejani. Wilson. Roberson. Mann & Fuchs. supra note 194. at
839-40.
201. See notes 89-94 supra and accompanying text. Foreseeabilit> will not be considered and
the manufacturer will be held strictly liable when the injury resulted from a manufatunng
defect, or if there was a positive representation of safety from the particular injurious defet S'e
notes 37, 84-87 supra and accompanying text. It is possible that the protection provided b%
unforeseeability could be lost if it is proved that the drug offers no substantial benefits See notes
48, 88 supra and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle. 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) m\arning must be transmitted
even if the risk of injury was one in three million and the risk was not to the drug user but to the
one in contact with the drug user); Sterling Drug. Inc v. Yarrow, 408 F 2d 'Y78 1tth Cir l%4tJi tif
a drug was promoted on a one-to-one basis via detail men. it would be reasonable under the
circumstances to have the warning transmitted similarly; Davis v W-eth Labs . lnc . 3wju F 2d
121 (9th Cir. 1968) (the warning of risk must be directly transmitted to the consumer under
certain circumstances); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co,. 9 Cal. 3d 51. 507 P 2d 653. 107 Cal Rptr
45 (1973) (overpromotion would make negligent prescription foreseeablei. Bine v Sterling Drug,
Inc., 422 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1968) (drug manufacturer is under the dut% to warn of side vffects
even if the exact nature of the side effect is not known). Incollingo v Ewtng. 444 Pa- 2h3. 282
A.2d 206 (1971) (an adequate warning can be nullified b. the manufacturer', promotional etfortb).
Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204. 210 S E.2d 289 o1974) (same). Crwkcr % Winthrop
Labs., Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974) (a positive representation of safet. will negate the
foreseeability defense); see notes 99-138 supra and accompan.ing text
203. See notes 41-49 supra and accompanying text
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or medically. 20 4 The key to such actual or constructive knowledge is a
national reporting system for adverse drug effects.
20 5
Currently, the FDA's Division of Drug Experience 20 6 "[clollect[s] and
evaluate[s] information on drug usage, adverse reactions and other drug
experience data. ' 20 7 Presently available surveillance sources have helped
substantiate the causal relationship of certain drugs with rare adverse reac-
tions, 20 8 such as DES and adenocarcinoma, 20 9 and potassium chloride and
gastrointestinal ulcerations. 210 The recognized need to expand these informa-
tion gathering sources has resulted in a joint project by the National Bureau
of Standards, 21' the FDA, and the Joint Commission on Prescription Drug
Use21 2 to investigate practical techniques of postmarketing surveillance.2 3
The results of this project will soon be available. 21 4 It already appears that
the Phase IV period of monitored release prior to full FDA approval of new
drugs will officially be required. 215 The United Kingdom has adopted a
similar system, under which the physician is informed of the limited nature of
the drug approval and commits himself "to supply specific information on the
response of each patient" to the manufacturer. 21 6 Such a system performs a
dual function. Information concerning the risks associated with the new drug
is transmitted from the manufacturer to provide the basis for an informed
choice. 21 7 Second, information concerning the consumer's reaction to the drug
is transmitted back to the manufacturer to provide the basis for knowledge-
able drug warnings and rational marketing policies. 218
A surveillance system that efficiently furnishes information on the effective-
ness and the effects of new drugs restricts the defense of unforeseeability by
204. The degree of risk inherent in a drug cannot be determined unless the incidence of
adverse effects can be accurately established. Similarly, the benefit of a therapy cannot be judged
without information concerning results in widespread use. See W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, supra
note 61, at 131; Inman, supra note 178, at 42; Gross, The Thorny Path of Clinical Pharmacology,
24 Clin. Pharmacol. Ther. 383, 392 (1978).
205. W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, supra note 61, at 131; Inman, supra note 178, at 43; see
Gross, supra note 204, at 391-92.
206. The Division of Drug Experience was established m 1970 pursuant to the reorganization
of the Bureau of Drugs. Lee & Turner, Food and Drug Administration's Adverse Drug Reaction
Monitoring Program, 35 Am. J. Hosp. Pharm. 929, 929 (1978).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 931.
209. Bichler v. Willing, 58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dep't 1977).
210. See O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286, 289-90 (8th Cir. 1967).
211. The National Bureau of Standards was created to establish consistent national standards
of measurement. 15 U.S.C. § 272 (1976).
212. This free standing commission, largely supported by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association, was established to investigate the effectiveness of adverse drug reaction monitoring
systems. Telephone Interview with Dr. John Adams, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(Mar. 12, 1980).
213. Lee & Turner, supra note 206, at 930.
214. Id.
215. See note 163 supra and accompanying text.
216. Dunne, supra note 36, at 39.
217. See Johnstone, supra note 163, at 174-75.
218. See id. at 174.
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making the unknown known. Someone must be injured before the danger is
known, however, and the unforeseeability defense should remain against this
initial injury. 2 19 Any costs of unavoidable harms that would be shifted from
the individual should be borne by society at large. 220 An insurance program
"that will ... compensate the occasional victims of serious unwanted effects"
would not only serve as a remedy by spreading the cost to society, but would
also facilitate the operation of a surveillance system.22 '
A federally sponsored program might provide the means for the establish-
ment and operation of a viable system. The federal government already plays
an integral regulatory role in the passage of a new drug into the market
place. 222 No new drug can move in interstate commerce without government
approval.223 Furthermore, the government sets the standards of "efficacy
and safety" required for approval prior to marketing224 and is in the best
position to distribute the costs of unforeseen adverse drug effects that re-
sult from marketing.2 25 The National Swine Flu Immunization Program,
219. "If such reaction had never occurred before, defendant could not know about it or in the
exercise of the required degree of care, could not have found out about it, and absent knowledge
of such reaction, there could be no duty to warn." Johnston v. Upjohn Co., 442 S W.2d 93, 97
(Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
220. Model Act, Analysis, § 106, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714. 62,727-28 (1979)
221. Inman, supra note 178, at 43.
222. See notes 150-63 supra and accompanying text.
223. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1976). Despite this requirement, the government disclaims any tort
liability flowing from this approval. Federal courts have dismissed actions against the United
States government based on injuries resulting from FDA approval of drugs, because drug
approval is a discretionary function exempted under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a) (1976). Gelley v. Astra Pharm. Prods.. Inc., 466 F. Supp. 182, 186 tD. Minn. 1979), Gray
v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 341-42 (S.D. Tex. 1978). Contra, Griffin v. United States,
500 F.2d 1059, 1063-64 (3d Cir. 1974) (decision to release a production lot of oral polio vaccine by
the biologic standards division of the Department of Health. Education, and Welfare not
considered exempt discretionary activity).
224. See notes 150-56 supra and accompanying text.
225. The need for and the appropriateness of government action in the area of products
liability compensation was recognized by the establishment of the Federal Interagency Task
Force on Product Liability in 1976 to investigate the "apparent crisis ...in the field of product
liability." Schwartz, The Federal Government and the Product Liability Problem: From Task-
Force Investigation to Decisions by the Administration, 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 573, 574 (1978).
The Task Force noted, among other major findings, that products liability insurance premiums
appeared to have significantly increased for pharmaceutical manufacturers, and that product
liability problems in this field "have reinforced trends against new product development." Id. at
577. President Carter requested that the Department of Commerce prepare an "options paper,"
with recommendations based on the Task Force Report. Id. at 575. This paper was published for
public comment on April 6, 1978. The Department qf Commerce Options Paper on Products
Liability and Accident Compensation Issues, 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612 (1978). The paper focused on
methods of assisting manufacturers in obtaining insurance at reasonable rates for products
liability injuries. Federal insurance was seen as a complicated and problematic area in which
further government intervention should be reserved "in case the product liability problem reaches
emergency proportions." Id. at 14,623. Both the Task Force and the Department of Commerce
recognized the problems of providing a no-fault compensation system in the consumer product
area. Schwartz, supra, at 586.
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established pursuant to the Swine Flu Act of 1976,226 is a direct precedent for
this type of government action. This legislation provided an exclusive remedy
against the United States for injuries resulting from the administration of the
swine flu vaccine. 227 The government retained the right to sue the vaccine
manufacturer for negligence or breach of contract in connection with the
program. 228 The constitutionality of the Swine Flu Act has been upheld. 229 A
similar program may provide an equitable way to compensate the victims of
unforeseeable adverse drug reactions. Admittedly, the conception and im-
plementation of such a program would not be without problems. 230 A
program directly patterned on the Swine Flu Act, incorporating the limitation
of an exclusive remedy against the government, 23' would not be desirable.
The legislative goal should be to offer a government remedy when the
plaintiff establishes the causal relation of injury and unforeseeable drug side
effect, yet fails to demonstrate a breach of the duty to warn. Such legislation
would compensate the injured plaintiff without inhibiting the development of
beneficial new drugs. It would not result in lowering pharmaceutical industry
safety standards because the manufacturer would still be directly liable for
any breach of duty of care now imposed by the courts. 232 The legislation
226. Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 247(b) (1976)).
227. Id. § 2(k)(1)(A)(ii), 90 Stat. at 1114, (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b(k)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp.
1978)).
228. Id. § 2(k)(5)(C)(7), 90 Stat. at 1117 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b(k)(7)(Supp. 1978)).
229. See Ducharme v. Merrill-Nat'l Labs., 574 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (5th Cir.) (denial of civil
cause of action against drug manufacturer does not violate fifth amendment), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1002 (1978). Wolfe v. Merrill Nat'l Labs., 433 F. Supp. 231, 236-37 (M.D. Tenn. 1977)
(upholding denial of right to jury trial under the Swine Flu Act); Sparks v. Wyeth Labs., Inc.,
431 F. Supp. 411, 418 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (same).
230. The Swine Flu Immunization Program has been the subject of recent criticism. Sce
Morgenstern, The Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Citizens From Communicable
Diseases, 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 537, 564-67 (1978) (the method of injury compensation was
inappropriate); Wecht, The Swine Flu Immunization Program: Scientific Venture or Political
Folly? 3 Am. J. L. & Med. 425 (1977-78) (validity of the entire program was questionable), The
Swine Flu Act was an emergency response to a potentially urgent situation. Time constraints
made a "careful and indepth [sic] review" of the entire bill impossible, and it was sent back to the
Senate from the Appropriations Committee "without prejudice or any specific recommendation."
S. Rep. No. 1147, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 119761 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1987, 1987. Compensation for victims of drug related injuries is a pressing problem, but it (toes
not approach the status of national emergency created by a possible epidemic of killing flu. The
legislature would not be under the same pressures and time constraints in dealing with this
products liability problem, and the problems encountered with the Swine Flu Act could be
minimized or negated.
231. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b(k)(3) (Supp. 1978).
232. See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.;'d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975) (manufacturer
breached the duty of care by overpromotion of the drug); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264
(5th Cir.) (manufacturer must effectively transmit the warning of potential injury, and when no
physician intervenes as "learned intermediary," that warning must go directly to the consumer),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (1960) (in the presence of a manufacturing defect, manufacturer may be held liable even
though negligence could not be established); Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.
1974) (positive representations of safety when knowledge was lacking would render the manufac-
turer liable). The private right of action should be maintained because one of the benefits of
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required to deal with this sensitive area would necessarily be complex, but the
problems raised by drug products liability are intricate. Complex questions
are not well served by simplistic answers.
Kathleen H. Wilson
products liability litigation has been to focus the manufacturers' attention on product safety.
Schwartz, supra note 225, at 589.
